Excerpt from Das Prinzip der Dialektischen Synthesis und die Kantische Philosophie B. Das synthetische Urteil in seinem Verhaltnis zur analytischen und synthetischen Einheit des Bewusstseins. Die Begriffe der analytischen und der synthetischen Einheit erhalten nun in der Kantischen Philosophie eine ganz besondere Bedeutung dadurch, dass auf ihrem Unterschied der Gegensatz der transzendentalen Logik zur aristotelischen Analytik beruht. Denn der Gegenstand der traditionellen Logik ist die blos analytische Einheit des Denkens, was sich schon daraus ersehen lasst, dass ihr durchaus die Definition (...) des Begriffs als einer Vor stellung zu Grunde liegt, die in anderen moglichen Vor stellungen, als deren gemeinschaftliches Merkmal (nota, enthalten ist. Durch einen solchen Begriff kann aber nie eine ganze Vorstellung, sondern immer nur ein Teil derselben, die synthetische Einheit ihres Bewusstseins also als zusammen gesetzt aus solchen Teilen, mithin nur analytisch gedacht werden. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

But, is there Eternity? It sounds so grandiose, when the poet says: "Eternity, thou pleasing, dreadful thought." The word, 'eternity' speaks, one might say, as with trumpet blasts and opens before us vistas of infinite spaces that may frighten us. It carries a solemnity with it which elevates us to a higher plane of existence. But we have become so suspicious of any such state of exultation, of any big word, that we wonder, whether 'eternity' is not merely an empty (...) phrase. We understand Time, but we do not understand Eternity. "The clock indicates a moment, but what does Eternity indicate?" Is there eternity at all? Yes, there is, for Time itself is eternal. Time is endless and has no beginning or end. Time cannot stop and, if it stopped, it would stop only at what no longer is Time, but Eternity. Thus, we cannot avoid thinking of some kind of eternity whenever we think of time at all, yes, whenever we think at all of what is true. For what is true is true at any time. Our object may be ever so transitory, may last only a fraction of a second, as for instance, a mesotron does, but that it is so, is true at any time. Our thinking itself is a temporal process, but, if it is true, its truth is true in eternity. (shrink)

Proponents of the projection strategy take an epistemic rule for the evaluation of English conditionals, the Ramsey test, as clue to the truth-conditional semantics of conditionals. They also construe English conditionals as stronger than the material conditional. Given plausible assumptions, however, the Ramsey test induces the semantics of the material conditional. The alleged link between Ramsey test and truth conditions stronger than those of the material conditional can be saved by construing conditionals as ternary, rather than binary, propositional functions with (...) a hidden contextual parameter. But such a ternary construal raises problems of its own. (shrink)

There is no set Δ of probability axioms that meets the following three desiderata: (1) Δ is vindicated by a Dutch book theorem; (2) Δ does not imply regularity (and thus allows, among other things, updating by conditionalization); (3) Δ constrains the conditional probability q(·,z) even when the unconditional probability p(z) (=q(z,T)) equals 0. This has significant consequences for Bayesian epistemology, some of which are discussed.

In my paper “On the Probabilities of Conditionals,” I claimed, mistakenly, that David Lewis’s four triviality results and Alan Hájek’s proof depend on the application of the following principle to conditionals containing nested conditionals.

Bayesian psychology, in what is perhaps its most familiar version, is incomplete: Jeffrey conditionalization is not a complete account of rational belief change. Jeffrey conditionalization is sensitive to the order in which the evidence arrives. This order effect can be so pronounced as to call for a belief adjustment that cannot be understood as an assimilation of incoming evidence by Jeffrey's rule. Hartry Field's reparameterization of Jeffrey's rule avoids the order effect but fails as an account of how new evidence (...) should be assimilated. (shrink)

In this paper, I derive a syntactic procedure for revising theories in propositional logic from considerations of indifference and informational economy (minimality). The procedure is very flexible. It allows us to make use of information about the relative epistemic merit (entrenchment) of the sentences in the theories whenever such information is available, and, unlike other procedures proposed in the literature, yields plausible results even for very simple entrenchment orderings.

We reconstruct recent work on macrosocial stress as if it were an instance of a research strategy that tests point-alternative hypotheses within a full-fledged research program. Because this strategy is free of various deficits that beset dominant strategies, our article demonstrates one way in which the confidence crisis may be overcome.

Before replication becomes mainstream, the potential for generating theoretical knowledge better be clear. Replicating statistically significant nonrandom data shows that an original study made a discovery; replicating a specified theoretical effect shows that an original study corroborated a theory. Yet only in the latter case is replication a necessary, sound, and worthwhile strategy.

We provide a retrospective of 25 years of the International Conference on AI and Law, which was first held in 1987. Fifty papers have been selected from the thirteen conferences and each of them is described in a short subsection individually written by one of the 24 authors. These subsections attempt to place the paper discussed in the context of the development of AI and Law, while often offering some personal reactions and reflections. As a whole, the subsections build into (...) a history of the last quarter century of the field, and provide some insights into where it has come from, where it is now, and where it might go. (shrink)

In many-valued logics with the unit interval as the set of truth values, from the standard negation and the product (or, more generally, from any strict Frank t-norm) all measurable logical functions can be derived, provided that also operations with countable arity are allowed. The question remained open whether there are other t-norms with this property or whether all strict t-norms possess this property. We give a full solution to this problem (in the case of strict t-norms), together with (...) convenient sufficient conditions. We list several families of strict t-norms having this property and provide also counterexamples (the Hamacher product is one of them). Finally, we discuss the consequences of these results for the characterization of tribes based on strict t-norms. (shrink)

Johann Christoph Gottsched gehört unbestritten zu den zentralen Figuren der deutschen Frühaufklärung. Wie wohl kein anderer vor und nach ihm hat er die Entwicklung der deutschsprachigen Sprach-, Rede-, Dicht- und Bühnenkunst geprägt, geleitet von der festen Absicht, diesen Künsten wo möglich eine wissenschaftliche Begründung, eine überschaubare kritische Historie sowie eine klare und elegante Darstellung zu verleihen. Über diese Bemühungen hinaus, hat sich insbesondere die neuere Forschung weiteren Facetten seines riesigen Werkes zugewendet. So erscheint Gottsched als Vorbild zahlreicher Zeitschriftenprojekte, als wichtiger (...) Popularisator der Leibnizschen und Wolffschen Philosophie, als zentraler Reformer der zeitgenössischen Homiletik, als Drehscheibe bei der Vermittlung europäischer Dichtung und Gelehrsamkeit. Die Beiträge des vorliegenden Bandes tragen der gesamten Breite der Gottsched-Forschung Rechnung, prüfen alte Erkenntnisse und stellen neue Einschätzungen zur Diskussion. Darüber wird die Aufmerksamkeit auch auf weniger bekannte Aspekte des Gottschedschen Oeuvres gelenkt, so etwa auf Beiträge zu den Naturwissenschaften und der Staatslehre, auf die akademische Lehrtätigkeit und auf das zunehmende Interesse an anthropologischen und ästhetischen Fragen. MIT BEITRÄGEN VON: Erich Achermann, Thomas Althaus, Detlef Döring, Frank Grunert, Gerda Hassler, Peter Hesselmann, Hanspeter Marti, Christian Meierhofer, Dagmar Mirbach, Merio Scattola, Oliver Scholz, Tomas Sommadossi, Holger Steinmann, Gideon Stiening, Andres Strassberger, Dietmar Till, Klaus Weimar und Jan-Henrik Witthaus. (shrink)

Erich Frank is chiefly known for two works. In Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer, 1923, Frank published the results of research to determine who the Pythagoreans actually were and what part they played in Plato's conception of nature. In 1945 he published Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth. It had been the hope of his friends that Frank would present a more comprehensive and systematic exposition of his thought. Frank's sudden death in 1948 put an end (...) to this hope. In Knowledge, Will and Belief Ludwig Edelstein has collected together twenty of Frank's papers and has appended an account of Frank's life and work. Until 1939 Frank was professor at Marburg. After that he was attached to universities in the United States. Half of the papers in this collection are in English, the others are in German. Readers in the English speaking world will find Frank's German quite readable. Half of the papers have not hitherto been published; of those which have been, many are hidden in unfamiliar journals. (shrink)

Historicism -- Time -- Interpretation -- Representation -- Reference -- Truth -- Meaning -- Presence -- Experience (I) -- Experience (II) -- Subjectivity -- Politics.

A theory is usually said to be time reversible if whenever a sequence of states S 1, S 2, S 3 is possible according to that theory, then the reverse sequence of time reversed states S 3 T, S 2 T, S 1 T is also possible according to that theory; i.e., one normally not only inverts the sequence of states, but also operates on the states with a time reversal operator T. David Albert and Paul Horwich have suggested that (...) one should not allow such time reversal operations T on states. I will argue that time reversal operations on fundamental states should be allowed. I will furthermore argue that the form that time reversal operations take is determined by the type of fundamental geometric quantities that occur in nature and that we have good reason to believe that the fundamental geometric quantities that occur in nature correspond to irreducible representations of the Lorentz transformations. Finally, I will argue that we have good reason to believe that space-time has a temporal orientation. (shrink)

It has been argued that the existence of faster than light particles in the context of special relativity would imply the possibility to influence the past, and that this would lead to paradox. In this paper I argue that such conclusions cannot safely be drawn without consideration of the equations of motion of such particles. I show that such equations must be non-local, that they can be deterministic, and that they can avoid the suggested paradoxes. I also discuss conservation of (...) energymomentum, and how instantaneous action at a distance can avoid similar paradoxes. *I am most grateful for helpful comments made by John Earman, and especially John Norton, who is responsible for anything that makes sense in this paper. I am also grateful for the reception of a Mellon postdoctoral fellowship, which supported me whilst doing the research for this paper. (shrink)

Educators find themselves in the midst of arising tide of urban school reform marked byevermore centrally designed and monitoredsystems of accountability. In response to thislooming high-stakes gaze of surveillance, thisessay offers an ethics of educationalleadership predicated upon taking up thechallenge of creatively and courageouslyauthoring one's ethical self. It seeks tocontribute to mapping an ethical terrain whichcan support the production of pedagogicalpractices, initiatives, and agendas asdistinctive, bold responses to theproliferation of one-dimensional,technicist-driven efforts which narrowlycalculate and assess student learning, teacherwork, school effectiveness, (...) and which offeranemic, foreclosed readings of a possiblefuture. My claim is that a consideration ofFoucault's ethics draws us closer torecognizing what such a project would mean andask of the educator as leader. (shrink)